

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY
AS RECTIFIED BY SCHOPENHAUER

M. KELLY, M.A., M.D.




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BY
SCHOPENHAUER

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PREFACE

ALTHOUGH Kant's discovery of the à priority of Time, Space, and Causality was as great an epoch in the history of philosophy as the law of gravitation in that of science, and rests on a more solid foundation than a mere empirical induction, which is only valid as far as experience goes, it may be confidently asserted that what is true in the transcendental philosophy is still either totally ignored or totally misunderstood. The reasons for this are not far to seek. After the death of Frederick the Great, who was notoriously a free-thinker, Kant was threatened with expulsion from the University of Königsberg, and compelled to discontinue writing, because the inferences from his philosophy were supposed to be subversive of religion. That the real enemies of religion were, not Kant, but those that sought

to make its vital truths depend on metaphysical jugglery, I will prove in the concluding chapter. The consequence was that a man who proved that a science of Metaphysics is impossible was replaced in Germany by a crowd of sham philosophers, whose art, according to the greatest of all Germans, consisted in the substitution of "words of learned length and thundering sound" for ideas,¹ thereby giving to ignorant people the impression that some profound wisdom must lie concealed behind their incomprehensible jargon. Translations of their books, owing to idiomatic differences in the languages, are a great deal worse than the original, and English students must, in consequence, either treat philosophy in general as a joke, or learn by heart what can convey no meaning to them, in order to score marks at examinations. Not long ago I listened to a lecture on Hegelism by one who is considered the most distinguished Englishman of the present day in this field of thought, and he expressed regret that language failed to make clear what Hegel really meant. But "*la clarté est la bonne foi des philosophes*," and where the language fails, the "*bonne foi*" must go with it,

¹ Wo die Begriffe fehlen, da stellt ein wort zur rechten Zeit sich ein. (Faust).

which I will show to be true in regard to Hegel. What sort of pabulum is provided for the enlightenment of the English student may be seen by reference to Prof. Bosanquet's translation of Lotze's *Metaphysics*. The translator himself gives the meaning of "Vorstellung" as "imagination," which would identify Kant's idealism with Berkeley's, an assumption against which the former indignantly protested ; while Lotze either misunderstands or misrepresents Kant's proofs of the *à priori* of Space and Time, being diametrically opposed to him even where he pretends to agree with him in regard to the "subjectivity" of space, because his application of the word "subjective" is a false one. I will give quotations to support all this. But perhaps the most important reason why Kant remains unknown is the fact that the solid foundation which he laid in the *Asthetik* was rendered nugatory by the superstructure with which he intended to complete it in the *Analytik*. This, although a work of genius, is false from beginning to end, and nobody but Schopenhauer could replace it, and at the same time point out where Kant was led astray. His *Principle of the Sufficient Ground* is, therefore, the completion of the *Asthetik*, and nobody can grasp what Trans-

cendental Idealism really means until he has understood the former. As the prevailing misconceptions regarding the Buddhist Nirvana and human personality can only be cleared up by Schopenhauer's extension of Kant's philosophy, and as so much attention has been recently directed to these subjects, it occurred to me that a short exposition of Transcendental Idealism with Schopenhauer's constructive and destructive criticism may be of use to those that cannot make a simultaneous study of Kant and Schopenhauer in the original. To think that the former can be understood without the latter is a fatal delusion. If anybody should doubt this, let him try to make out what Kant meant by the "Schematismus," and he will soon find it advisable to avail himself of the assistance of a man who is worth ten times more than all the post-Kantian philosophers and professors put together. It is above all things necessary to be on one's guard against the unwarranted assumption of a special faculty for "thinking" objects, and another for "reasoning," as this has been eagerly accepted and utilised by metaphysicians for their own ends.

CHAPTER I

DEFINITIONS

OWING to the relative poverty of the English language as compared with the German, and the consequent difficulty of finding a suitable word in the former for certain ideas expressed in the latter, it is of vital importance to understand what is meant by some English words used in philosophy. The most important of those are :—

- 1 *Perception* (*Anschauung*). The German word is applied to visible objects, and also to the act of perceiving them. I will use the English word in the same sense. The same holds good for the blind, who can acquire an accurate knowledge of the same objects through the sense of touch. A perception is empirical when acquired through the medium of sensation, and *à priori*, or pure, when independent of the latter. The object of the *Transcendental Aesthetik* is to prove that we have an *à priori* perception of Time and Space. The Germans distinguish an empirical perception

from an *à priori* one by saying that the former is combined with "*Wahrnehmung*," for which the only equivalent in English is also "*perception*," so that it would be necessary to note the special application of the word in this sense.

- 2 *Presentation* (*Vorstellung*). This word denotes that objects, as they appear to us, are dependent on *à priori* conditions in our mind, what they are, apart from our mode of perception, being unknown to us. The act of so representing them is also expressed by the same word. When applied to an empirical perception, it is said to be "*intuitive*" to distinguish it from an "*abstract*" one, which is formed from the perception by the process of thinking. An *à priori* presentation refers to an *à priori* perception. Prof. Bosanquet, in his translation of Lotze's *Metaphysics*, gives the meaning of the word *Vorstellung* as "*imagination*," the exact opposite of the true sense, as will be seen in due course.

- 3 *Ideas* (*Begriffe*). An idea or notion is formed by abstraction from an empirical perception. In the *Transcendental Analytik*, Kant seeks to prove that the thinking faculty has *à priori* ideas, which, although not derived from experience, determine the laws in accordance with which objects must be connected together in order that we may have

experience of them. Such an application of an à priori idea would depend on its making use of the à priori perception of the formal possibility of experience in general.

An idea, especially if it has had its origin in Germany, must be carefully controlled, in order to make sure that its content has a solid foundation in perception. Otherwise something may be privately wrapped up in it with the object of extracting it afterwards as if it were the result of the idea.

- 4 *Transcendental ideas* (Ideen). Kant assigns those to the reason (Vernunft), which he unjustifiably separates from the thinking faculty. They form the subject of the Transcendental Dialektik.
- 5 *Intelligence* (Verstand). The faculty of referring an effect to its cause. The operation must be called "intellectual" for want of any special word.
- 6 *Understanding*. This word is applied to the thinking faculty, as it has been customary in England to speak of the "Categories of the Understanding." There is really no such faculty apart from reason. Kant calls it the "verstand," which I have just defined as "intelligence."

CHAPTER II

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ANALYTICAL AND SYNTHETICAL JUDGMENTS

A JUDGMENT expresses the relation between two ideas, the "subject" and the "predicate." If the latter contains nothing more than is already assumed in the former, being simply an analysis or explanation of it, the judgment is said to be analytical. If the predicate adds something that is not already thought of in the subject, the judgment is a synthetical one. If the idea with which we started be an empirical one we enlarge our knowledge of it, and so convert our analytical into a synthetical judgment by a further appeal to empirical perception. The mere analysis of the idea would reveal nothing more than what is already contained in it. An empirical judgment, and this is a fact of vital importance in Kant's philosophy, can never have the character of universality and necessity (apodicticity), for experience only teaches us that something is true so far as our observation has gone, not that it must

always necessarily be so. The method of science consists in observing facts, endeavouring to form a theory to account for them, and then applying the test of experiment for the purpose of proving whether the theory holds good in all possible cases. This process of tracing the effect to its cause can never lead to absolute certainty, for the same effect may be due to different causes. The character of necessity is only obtained when we argue from cause to effect ; given the cause, the effect must necessarily follow. Therefore no scientific induction can give the conviction of necessity and universality which we find in the case of geometrical axioms, and the latter must have an *à priori* origin. As they are also synthetic, the question arises : "How is a synthetic *à priori* judgment possible ? "

That "two straight lines cannot enclose a space" is a judgment, the truth of which cannot be derived from our ideas of straight lines and of the number two, whereas it is at once manifest when we have recourse to perception by the "construction" of the ideas. A "rectangular equilateral triangle" contains no logical contradiction between the ideas of rectangular and triangular. On constructing our idea of a triangle, however, which we do without having

recourse to empirical perception, we obtain the unalterable conviction of the incompatibility. In both of these examples we form a synthetic judgment with the aid of a perception. But the latter is not empirical, nor would it give the character of necessity if it were so ; therefore it must be *à priori*. This is Kant's so-called "transcendental" proof that our idea of space is an *à priori* perception, and will be referred to again. The propositions of Euclid are proved by the logical process of showing that if something is taken for granted something else must necessarily follow. The conviction of their truth, however, finally rests on perception, and Geometry is only possible on the assumption that a pure perception *à priori* underlies it. Similarly it can be shown that Arithmetic would be impossible without the *à priori* perception of time. All reckoning consists in the constant repetition or multiplication of unity. We could not do this if we had not the idea of succession, and the idea of succession is only possible on the assumption that we have an *à priori* perception of Time. The character of necessity is more manifest in Arithmetic than in Geometry, because Time has only one dimension, whereas higher Geometry becomes too complicated for perception and must take

refuge in Arithmetic. Again, $7+5=12$ is a synthetical proposition. No combination of the idea of 5 with that of 7 will give the idea of 12. We must first have recourse to a perception which corresponds to one of the two, *e.g.*, 5 fingers or 5 points, and then gradually add the units of the 5 given in the perception to the idea of 7, when we see the number 12 appear. Thus propositions of Arithmetic, like the axioms of Euclid, are synthetical *à priori*.

But how is it possible that an *à priori* perception, which is independent of experience, can have validity for real objects of experience? The answer to this is contained in the Transcendental Aesthetik, which considers the part played by the "sensitivity" in the acquirement of our empirical knowledge.

CHAPTER III

THE TRANSCENDENTAL AESTHETIK

THE source of our empirical knowledge is a change in the state of a sense organ caused by some body. This change of state is a sensation ; the capacity of forming a presentation from it is sensibility ; and the perception so acquired is empirical, in contradistinction to the *à priori* form, which is said to be pure, because it is independent of sensation. The object is composed of "matter" and "form," the former being that which corresponds to the sensation, while the latter is that which causes the object to be perceived in certain order and relations. As that in which the sensations can be so arranged cannot be itself sensation, only the matter can be given *à posteriori*, and the form must exist *à priori* in the mind. After separating all that belongs to sensation it will be proved that there are two pure forms of sensual perception as principles of *à priori* cognition. These are Space and Time. The outer sense is a quality of the

mind by which we present objects external to us in space. The inner sense is that by means of which we perceive our own inner state, so that all that belongs to our inner determinations is presented in relations of Time.

CHAPTER IV

PROOFS THAT SPACE IS AN À PRIORI FORM OF
THE OUTER SENSE

- 1 It would be impossible to refer certain sensations to something outside ourselves, and at the same time present them in places near and distinct from one another, if the idea of Space did not already underlie them. Accordingly, the idea of Space cannot be borrowed from the relations of external objects through experience, but this experience is only rendered possible by the idea thought of.
- 2 We can think away every object from Space, but not Space itself. This fact would of itself be sufficient proof that Space attaches to the mind and is a condition of objective apperception.
- 3 The different parts of Space are formed by limitations of a single all-inclusive one, do not exist before it, and do not form it by being put together as its constituents. The contrary would be the case if Space were a universal idea of the relations of things generally. Consequently Space must be a pure perception.

- 4 Space is thought of as an infinite magnitude, and all parts of Space, ad infinitum, are simultaneous. But a general idea of Space can determine nothing in regard to magnitude, and no idea of relations would convey the principle of their endlessness, which is only possible in the course of perception.

These four proofs Kant calls "metaphysical." The fifth is the "transcendental," which has been already given :—

- 5 The apodictic certainty of all geometrical axioms, the possibility of their construction *a priori*, and of Geometry itself cannot be explained on any other assumption.

To show how Kant is misunderstood and misrepresented, I ask the reader to carefully compare 3 and 4, with the following from Bosanquet's translation of Lotze's *Metaphysics*.¹

"It (Space) is like an integral obtained by extending the relation which connects two points to the infinite number of possible points. Of course; in the above remarks I owe to the guidance of Kant all that I have here said in agreement with his account in the *Transcendental Aesthetik*."

¹ Vol. I., page 236.

So far from being in agreement with the latter, it is diametrically the opposite. If the idea of Space were obtained by the process of integration here referred to, the parts would come first in point of time, whereas they exist simultaneously with the whole, and are formed by limitations of it. Moreover the integration would never give the idea of an infinite magnitude.

Again :—" Nothing short of the antinomies, in which we become entangled if we attempt to unite our idea of the entirety of the world or of its ultimate constituent parts with this presupposition of an actual Space, decided Kant for his assumption that the Space preception was nothing but a subjective form of apprehension with which the nature of the real that had to be presupposed had nothing in common. With this indirect establishment of his doctrine I cannot agree, because the purely phenomenal nature of Space does not properly speaking remove any of the difficulties on account of which Kant was compelled to assert it."¹

Here we have a false and a self-contradictory statement in one breath, viz., that "the proof that decided Kant was an indirect one." The

¹ Vol. I., page 240.

five proofs that decided Kant are given above, and it will be observed that they contain no reference whatever to the indirect one, which he gives under the antinomy of Space, and to which he took care to attach no "dogmatic" value. The obvious suggestion is that the *à priori* of Space should stand or fall with the indirect proof.

CONCLUSIONS FROM THE ABOVE.

We are now in a position to understand how an *à priori* perception, which is independent of experience, can have validity for real objects of experience. The explanation is that Space is a subjective quality of the subject, the form of all objects of the outer sense. In other words, it is the condition on which things can become objects of outer perception for us. This is what is meant by saying that Space has empirical or objective reality. Accordingly it must contain, before all experience, principles of the relations of objects as they appear to us. It cannot represent a quality of "things-in-themselves," or of their relations to one another independently of all subjective conditions of perception, for neither absolute nor relative determinations can be perceived before the existence of the things to

which they belong. Therefore, when Prof. Lotze says¹:—"I cannot persuade myself that this so-called reality of Space is reconcilable with the grounds which cause the rejection of its transcendental validity for the world of things-in-themselves," one can only come to the conclusion that a metaphysician is psychologically incapable of understanding one who has proved that a science of Metaphysics is impossible.

Again Prof. Lotze says²:—"Of course it (Space) is innate in the only sense the expression can bear, and in this sense colours and sounds are innate too." It is difficult to believe that this misunderstanding is not the result of deliberate intention. Neither colour nor sound is a condition on which we can perceive objects, whereas Space is so. We cannot construct a rose in Space from the colour of it, nor a musical instrument from the sound that it emits, nor a piece of sugar from the taste of it. These simply depend on special qualities of the organs of sense, and may be different in different people. Therefore the presentation of Space is the only one referring to anything external that can be said to be *à priori* objective.

¹ Vol. I., page 241.

² Vol. I., page 231.

CHAPTER V

PROOFS OF THE À PRIORITY OF TIME

- 1 THE idea of Time cannot be derived from experience, for we could not be aware of simultaneity or succession, if it did not underlie them *à priori*.
- 2 We can think away all objects from Time, but not Time itself.
- 3 Time is not a discursive or general idea; for different Times are only parts of the same Time, and the presentation which is given by one object is a perception. The proposition that "different Times are not simultaneous" is a synthetical one, and, therefore, cannot spring from ideas alone, as has been already explained.
- 4 If our presentation of anything were due to ideas, the partial presentations would be first formed, and the general idea by putting these together. But the endlessness of time means nothing more than that every definite magnitude of Time is only possible through limitations of a single underlying Time. Therefore our presentation of

Time is an *à priori* perception. The four proofs above given are the "methaphysical" ones. The "transcendental" one has been already given. It is, otherwise expressed, the following :—

- 5 The axioms of Time generally have apodictic certainty, but could not have it if they were derived from experience. Without the *à priori* presentation of time it would be impossible to have an idea of change or movement (change of place). Time is the possibility of change in the same place.

To illustrate and give force to Kant's arguments, I will again quote Lotze¹—"On the contrary, we have no primary proper perception of it (Time) at all. The character of direct perception attaching to our idea of Time is only obtained by images which are borrowed from Space."

According to this, Space would exist by itself before we got the idea of Time from it. But all our empirical knowledge commences in a change in the state of a sense organ, and we could not have consciousness of change without an *à priori* perception of Time. Consequently, on Lotze's assumption, we could acquire no empirical knowledge, and no idea of Time at all. Moreover,

¹ Vol. I., page 315.

we could have no self-consciousness. Such a misconception of Time can be avoided by bearing in mind that it is the "possibility of change." If a cord be drawn between my fingers, I acquire the perception of a cylinder-shaped body in motion. My perception of the cord depends on a change in my sense of touch, and this change is only possible if I have an *à priori* perception of Time. If I could not be conscious of a change in my sense of touch, I could have no idea of causality ; for this consists in referring a change to its cause. Finally, without the idea of causality, as will be proved, I could have no knowledge at all. The constant reappearance of theories that the idea of Time can be derived in some *à posteriori* fashion justifies me in repeating that, on any such assumption :—

- 1 We could think away Time, which we cannot do.
- 2 Calculation would be impossible.
- 3 $7 + 5 = 12$ would not be a synthetic *à priori* proposition, which it undoubtedly is.
- 4 The idea of Time obtained in such a way would be an abstract general one, on which it would be impossible to found the synthetic *à priori* proposition that "different times cannot be simultaneous."
- 5 The perception of an all-embracing endless

Time, the different parts of which are formed by limitations of it, would be impossible.

- 6 We could have no idea of change, and, consequently, neither knowledge nor self-consciousness.

CONCLUSIONS FROM THE ABOVE.

Time does not exist for itself, or inhere in things apart from the subjective conditions of our perception of them. For, in the former case, it would be something real without real object ; and in the second, it could not precede the objects as their condition, and be recognised and perceived by synthetic *a priori* principles. This is possible, however, if Time be nothing but the subjective condition on which perceptions can take place in us. Time is nothing but the form of the inner sense, that is, of the perception of ourselves and of our inner state. It determines the relations of things in our inner state, but is no determination of figure or position. The relations of Time can, however, be represented by a line prolonged indefinitely (with the difference that the parts are after one another in Time but simultaneous in the line), and this shows that the presentation of Time itself is a perception. Space, as a condition *a*

priori, is limited to external objects, but Time is the formal condition of all objects generally, because they are all determinations of our inner state. All outer objects are in Space and determined in accordance with *à priori* relations of Space ; all objects of the senses are in Time and necessarily in relations of Time.

The Transcendental Aesthetik can contain nothing more than these two elements ; for all other ideas belonging to the sensibility, even that of motion, which combines both, presuppose something empirical. As Space, considered in itself, is not movable, the movable must be something which is found in Space by experience. Nor does it contain the idea of change *à priori* ; for Time itself does not change, but something that is in it.

Here Kant brings the part played by the sensibility to a conclusion by saying that, by means of it, the "perception is given," but that this perception is not real knowledge of the object until it has been referred to the latter by his 12 categories. According to this idea there could be no real experience of objects of the senses without the aid of the thinking faculty ; so that the lower animals must either be able to think, or be unable to acquire empirical knowledge

of anything. Schopenhauer's criticism of the categories is constructive and destructive. The former is contained in his "Principle of the Sufficient Ground," of which I will now give a short summary.

CHAPTER VI

SCHOPENHAUER'S PRINCIPLE OF THE SUFFICIENT
GROUND

THE definition of this Principle is :—"Nihil est sine ratione cur potius sit quam non sit." There is nothing without a ground for its being so.

Being the common expression for the different laws of our cognitive faculty, there can be no question of a proof of it ; for every proof consists in tracing something back to what has been already recognised ; and, if we again demand a proof of the latter, we at length arrive at principles which express the forms and laws, or the conditions of all thinking and cognition.

Accordingly, certainty is nothing more than agreement with these conditions. Before Schopenhauer only two applications of the Principle had been recognised, the one to judgments, which, in order to be true, must have a ground ; the other to real objects, which must always have a cause. But all cases in which we are entitled to ask "Why" are not included under these two

relations. If I ask :—" Why are the three sides in this triangle equal ? "

The answer is :—" Because the three angles are equal." But the equality of the angles is not the cause of the equality of the sides ; for there is no question of a change, that is to say, of an effect which must have a cause. Nor can it be a ground of knowing ; for the idea of the equality of the sides is not contained in that of the equality of the angles. There is here no connection between ideas or judgments, but between sides and angles. The equality of the angles is not directly the ground of the recognition of the equality of the sides, but indirectly, inasmuch as there is a necessary connection between sides and angles, not a direct and necessary connection of two judgments. Again, it cannot be explained by means of mere ideas why the past is irrevocable and the future inevitable. It is also not a case of causality, as this only controls events in Time, but not Time itself. How the present hour has annihilated the past we recognise immediately and intuitively, just as we do the difference between right and left and what depends on this ; for example, that the left glove does not fit the right hand.

THE ROOT OF THIS PRINCIPLE

Our cognitive consciousness, appearing as outer and inner sensibility (receptivity), intelligence, and reason, is divided into subject and object, and contains nothing more. To say that a thing is an object of the subject, means that it is our presentation, and that all our presentations are objects of the subject. It will be seen that all our presentations are connected together by certain laws, which, so far as the form is concerned, are *à priori* determinable, and that, in consequence of this connection, nothing existing separately and detached from the others can become an object for us. This connection is what the Principle of the sufficient Ground in its generality expresses, and assumes a different form for the different classes of objects without altering its general character. The word "root" is used to indicate the relations that underlie each class. It must be understood, however, that there are not four distinct roots for the four different classes of objects, but that there is a common root manifesting itself in four different forms. In other words, the root is a fourfold one.

The first class of objects for the subject and

the form of the Principle of the sufficient Ground that prevails in it :—

The first class of possible objects of our presentative faculty is that of the perceptible, complete, empirical presentations. They are “perceptible,” in contradistinction to the “abstract ideas,” which are the result of thought ; “complete,” in so far as they contain, according to Kant’s distinction, both the “matter” and the “form ;” “empirical,” partly in so far as they have their origin, not in the mere connecting together of thoughts, but in an affection of the sensitive body, to which they always refer for confirmation of their reality, partly because, according to the laws of Space, Time, and Causality combined, they belong to that complex without beginning or end known as empirical reality.

In this class of objects the principle of the sufficient Ground appears as the law of causality, the ground of Becoming, *principium rationis sufficientis fiendi*. All objects constituting the complex of empirical reality are, in regard to the entrance and exit of their states, and, consequently, in the direction of the course of Time, bound together by it. When a new state of one or several real objects appears, another must have preceded it, which it follows in accordance with

a fixed law. The first state is called the cause, the second the effect. As the appearance of a new state is a change, the law of causality has only to do with changes. Each effect indicates a change which was its cause, and this again another change which preceded it and of which it is the effect. Thus the chain of causality has no beginning. It is, therefore, false to say that one object is the cause of another ; for an object contains not only the form and quality, but also the matter, which does not change. The law of causality having, as will be presently proved, an *à priori* origin, it is valid for all possible experience, and the relation of cause to effect is a necessary one. It belongs to the essential character of causality that the cause should precede the effect in point of time ; therefore Kant's theory of "reciprocal action" is impossible, as it assumes that the effect is also the cause of the cause and precedes it in Time. His deduction of the category of "community" or reciprocal action, will be referred to again under the criticism of the categories. All the supposed examples of reciprocal action are either a state of rest, to which the idea of causality does not apply, or an alternate succession of homonymous states which determine one another in accordance with the law.

of causality. An example of the first sort would be the scales of a balance brought to a state of equilibrium by equal weights. Here there is no change, and, consequently, no action. The removal of one weight, giving rise to a new state, causes the other scale to sink in accordance with the law of cause and effect. An example of the other sort is the burning of a fire. The combination of oxygen with the coal is the cause of heat, and this is again the cause of the renewal of the chemical combination. This is nothing but a chain of causes and effects, the links of which are alternately homonymous, but not the same.

The idea is also not supported by the fact that action and reaction are equal. This depends on the fact that cause and effect are not two bodies, but two successive states of bodies, and that, consequently, the cause affects both in like proportion. In the case of one body striking another, for instance, the change in the one will be the same as that in the other, each in proportion to its mass and velocity.

If all action were reciprocal action, succession and simultaneity would be the same thing, and perpetual motion would not only be possible but *a priori* certain. It is obvious, therefore, that there

is no special form or category of the understanding for reciprocal action.¹

From the law of causality result two important corollaries, the truth of which is thus recognised *à priori*. These are : The law of "inertia" and that of the "persistence of substance." The first says that every state of a body must continue until a cause comes into operation to alter it.

The second, which expresses the eternity of matter, follows from the fact that the law of causality is only applicable to states of a body, that is to say, its rest, motion, form, and quality, but not to the bearer of these. Matter can neither be created nor destroyed.

The conviction of the persistence of the substance cannot be obtained *à posteriori*, partly because it would be impossible in most cases to prove it empirically, partly because an induction arrived at in this way would only have precarious or approximate certainty.

The forces of nature are also not included in the chain of causes and effects, because they are that which imparts to causes their capability of acting. The cause, like its effect, is a single

¹ Some stars disappear long before the light from them reaches the eye. According to Kant, that would be impossible, because the eye could not act upon them.

change; the force of nature is universal, unchangeable, and present in every place and time. The rule which a force of nature follows in regard to its appearance in the chain of causes and effects is the "law" of nature.

Accordingly, it cannot be said, for instance, that electricity and gravity are causes, nor can they be looked upon as effects.

PROOF OF THE À PRIORITY OF THE LAW OF
CAUSALITY AND THAT EMPIRICAL PERCEPTION
IS THE WORK OF THE "INTELLIGENCE."

Only two of the senses, touch and sight, furnish the raw materials for objective perception. The three others indicate the presence of objects otherwise known to us, but contain no data for the determination of their relations in Space.

In the case of sight, what is immediately given is limited to the sensation of the retina, which, although it admits of great variety, amounts to an impression of brightness and darkness with their intermediate stages, and that of the special colours. This sensation is completely subjective, that is to say, exists within the organism, and has no likeness to the figure, position, proximity, or distance of things outside us. The intelligence by means of its function of referring the effect to

its cause, and with the assistance of the form of Space, now converts this limited material into the visible world, to do which it must have *à priori* knowledge of the causal relation. If vision consisted in mere sensation, we would perceive¹ the impression of the object inverted, because we receive it so, in accordance with well-known optical principles. We would also perceive it as something in the interior of the eye, since we should be limited to the sensation. In reality the intelligence comes in with its law of causality, takes from the sensation the datum of direction in which the ray of light entered the eye, and follows this back to its cause, which then appears upright as an object in Space. The pure intellectuality of the operation, to the exclusion of all physiological or other explanations, is confirmed by the fact that if one places the head between the legs, or lies on a slope with the head downwards, things are not seen inverted, although everything in the eye is so, but not the intelligence. The next thing that the latter does, is to combine the impressions which have been received on corresponding points of the two retinae, and refer them to a common cause, with the result

¹ Wahrnehmen.

that only a single object is seen. If the normal convergence of the eyes is interfered with, as happens in squint, the rays of light from an object no longer fall on corresponding points of the retinae, and the object is seen double, because the intelligence has learned to refer to one cause only the impressions received on corresponding points, and, accordingly, now concludes that the second effect must be due to a second cause. It is only under certain conditions and after some time, if it can happen at all, that the double vision is got rid of, although the subject knows that there is only one object. This proves that perception is not a function of the thinking faculty, as Kant maintains. The same thing may be observed by placing two objects at different distances before the eye and then looking at each alternately, when the one not looked at appears double. The stereoscope, which is an artificial arrangement for bringing rays of light to corresponding points of the retinae, while the axes of the eyes are parallel, thus gives single vision of two objects. Here also the thinking faculty cannot get rid of the false impression.

The well-known experiment of placing a ball between the crossed-fingers, when two balls are felt, is explained on exactly similar

principles for the sense of touch. The attempted physiological explanations of single vision are refuted by the following considerations :—

- 1 The corresponding sides of the retinae, for the purposes of single vision, are the reverse of what is true in the organic sense, the left side of the left eye corresponding to the left side of the right, and vice versa in the former.
- 2 On the assumption that single vision is due to a partial decussation of the optic nerves, double vision on squinting would be impossible.

Moreover, cases are on record where there was no decussation.

- 3 If we close the right eye with the hand and then stare at the sun with the left, the after image will be seen by the left eye, not by the right.

The sensation of the eye being merely planimetric, the third operation of the intelligence is the addition of the third dimension. Its only data for this purpose are :—The direction in which the eye receives the impression, the boundaries of the latter, and the various gradations of light and shade, which point immediately to their cause. A drawing on the principle of projection is a representation of the

sensation of vision with the data which it yields for this third operation of the intelligence, which then adds the third dimension just as it does in the case of a real body. The art of the painter also consists in representing the data of the sensation in vision.

The fourth operation of the intelligence is the recognition of the distance of objects, since the sensation gives nothing but the direction in which they lie. The angle of vision alone, which is the chief factor for this purpose, can by itself only give ambiguous results. For the correct determination of distance it is necessary that it should be combined with linear perspective, or, when that is not available, supported by the four following subsidiary data :—

- 1 The alteration of the refraction of the eye by the muscle of accommodation. We have a certain sensation of the inner changes so produced, and utilise them for the estimation of distance. It is only available within the limits of accommodation.
- 2 The optical angle, which enables us to recognise not only the distance, but also the place of an object. It is only available within distances which compel the eyes to converge.
- 3 The air perspective.

4 The known size of intermediate objects.

All these operations prove that every effect is referred to its cause by the intelligence, which on the foundation of the *à priori* perceptions of Time and Space, produces the cerebral phenomenon of the objective world, the senses furnishing the data only. That the thinking faculty has no share in this is proved by the fact that when the intelligence has once referred an effect to a wrong cause, whereby a false appearance arises, the latter cannot be got rid of even when it is known to be false. For instance, double vision and double sensation of touch, owing to displacement of the organs of sense from their normal position; the fact that the moon appears larger on the horizon; the painted relief, which we take for a real one; the movement of a bank on which we stand when a ship passes by; the near appearance of hills when the atmosphere is clear, owing to the absence of the air perspective. In such cases the intelligence presupposes the cause with which it is already familiar. That perception is not sensual should be obvious from the nature of sensation, but the fact may be confirmed by such cases as the following:—

- 1 We generally estimate the size of a man correctly at different distances from us, although

the angle of vision and the size of the image on the retina may vary considerably.

- 2 If I stare for some time at a red cross and then let the physiological colour spectrum of green in my eye fall on a surface in front of me, the size of the green cross will increase with the distance of the surface, although the size of the spectrum on the retina remains the same. Here the perception takes place as it would in the case of an external object, although it follows from a subjective ground.

- 3 Flourens has given physiological confirmation of the intellectuality of perception by removing the cerebral lobes in such a way as to leave the eye intact as an organ of sensation, when vision is, nevertheless, lost. Although Time, Space, and the law of Causality exist preformed in the intelligence, their application to empirical data is only acquired by exercise and experience.

Locke maintained that the idea of causality was derived from the action of the will on the limbs and from the resistance which bodies oppose to the pressure on them. The first supposition is false, because the action of the will and that of the limbs are not cause and effect, but the same thing doubly perceived, first in the self-consciousness, or the inner sense, and then in

the outer perception in Space as action of the body. The second is also false ; for we must recognise the body before it can act on us as a motive for pressing on it. The independence of the law of causality has been proved by showing that the possibility of all experience is dependent on it.

REFUTATION OF KANT'S PROOF OF THE *À PRIORI* OF THE LAW OF CAUSALITY

The proof just given of the *à priori* of the law of causality is confirmed by the apodicticity which we attribute to it, in which respect it differs from every necessity founded on induction. It is possible, for example, to think that the law of gravitation¹ should cease to act, but not that this could happen without a cause. According to Kant our perception of objects is not real experience of them, but remains merely subjective until they are connected together by the same mental function that is brought into play in forming a hypothetical judgment. This mental function, the category of causation, must have an *à priori* origin, since we could have no experience if it were not so. The explanation implies that animals possess the faculty of

¹ Kant erroneously assumed this law to be of *à priori* origin.

reflection, and that all sequence is consequence. Hume made the opposite mistake in saying that all is mere sequence, and that the idea of causation is acquired from the custom of associating things together in sequence.

Kant's idea is that the objectivity of the succession of our presentations consists in their agreement with the succession of real objects, and can only be recognised by means of the rule in accordance with which they follow one another, or the law of causation. "The mere succession of presentations in my apprehension might be altered at pleasure, and justifies no judgment, unless founded on the law of causality." The absurdity of such an assumption can be easily illustrated, and I think it quite superfluous to discuss the cases which he adduces in support of it. If I walk out of the front door, and a tile falls from the roof on my head, I have objective knowledge of the succession without any relation of causality, nor could I have altered the event after my experience. The succession of notes in a melody cannot be arranged differently by me, and the notes do not follow one another as cause and effect. The common cause of day and night was unknown before the time of Copernicus, but nobody ever thought that one was the cause of

the other. According to Hume, we would derive our idea of causality from the experience that one always follows the other. The sequence of events is recognised empirically just as the proximity of things in Space is, and the pure intelligence can no more understand it than it can the difference between left and right. From the form of Time in the sensibility we get the knowledge of the possibility of succession, and the sequence of actual objects is recognised empirically as a reality. The "necessity of a sequence" of two states, that is, of a change, is recognised by the intelligence, by means of the principle of causality.

CAUSALITY AND MATTER

Our perception of objects being brought about by their action on our sense organs, the specific form and qualities of each are their special modes of action, and what remains after the separation of these, the matter, must be the same in all. Therefore, matter is action in general, or causality objectively apprehended, and causality can have no application to it, just as the eye cannot see itself. The form presupposes Space, and the action denotes a change, and, therefore, a determination of Time. Thus a combination of Space

and Time constitutes the essence of matter. If Space existed by itself, there would be no change, and, consequently, neither causality nor matter. If Time existed by itself, there would be neither duration nor change. The essence of change does not consist in a mere alteration of states, but in the fact that in the same locality in Space there is now one state, and afterwards another, and that, at a definite time, there is here one state and there another. In other words, Time and Space mutually limit each other, and are simultaneously, and in combination, concerned in every change. Accordingly, causality, which produces change, unites Space with Time. But we have seen that matter is action, or causality; therefore it must unite in itself the qualities of Space and Time. It thus brings about the idea of simultaneity, which would be impossible in either of these alone. Again, as duration is only recognisable by the alteration of what is simultaneous with the permanent, there could be no reality if Space and Time were not combined in matter. Further, the alteration of quality and form receives the character of change from the co-existence of the permanent, that is to say, from the persistence of the substance. Matter indicates its origin from Space, partly by the form, which is inseparable

from it, but chiefly by its persistence, the *à priori* certainty of which is, therefore, derived from that of Space and not from the recognition of Time, as Kant maintains. Its origin from Time is manifested by the quality, which is action on other matter, or change.

SECOND CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT, AND
THE FORM OF THE PRINCIPLE OF THE SUFFICIENT
GROUND PREVAILING IN IT

In this class are included the abstract presentations, or ideas, in contradistinction to the perceptible, from which the former are derived by means of the thinking faculty. The possession of this faculty is the only essential difference between man and the lower animals. By means of it the perceptions are analysed, so that the constituents may be thought of separately as the various qualities, or relations of the things. The ideas thus formed contain, therefore, less than the original perceptions, have lost their perceptibility, and must be fixed by means of words. If we compare different objects of perception, retaining that which is common to them all, and dropping the remainder, the resulting idea is the genus, and the subordinate ones the species. The

higher the process is carried, accordingly, the less is thought of in the abstraction. From the use of words it is evident that, with the exception of proper names, they represent general ideas only. This explains why animals have no language, and understand only proper names. Thinking being, in the narrower sense of the word, the process of operating with ideas, enables us to think of many things in one idea and drop differences of every sort, even those of Space and Time, whereby we obtain a survey of the past and future, and of what is absent, while the animals are tied to the present in every respect. Ideas are more especially the proper material of the sciences, the object of which is the recognition of the particular by means of the general.

REPRESENTATIVES OF ABSTRACT NOTIONS

A phantasm must not be confounded with an abstract idea, because, although a perceptible and complete presentation, it is not immediately produced by impression on the senses, and does not, therefore, belong to the complex of experience. It must also be distinguished from the idea when employed as a representative of it. This happens when we want to have the perceptible presenta-

tion from which the idea is derived, and corresponding to the latter, which is never possible. For example, there is no fantasm corresponding to a dog in general. We must evoke the fantasm of a particular dog, which, as a presentation, must be completely defined, that is, of a certain size, form, colour, &c., although the idea of which it is the representative has not all these attributes.

According to Kant, on the contrary, we can only procure the image corresponding to the idea by means of a schema, or monogram of the pure imagination *à priori*, which, in the present case, would be neither dog nor wolf.

All thinking in the wider sense of the word requires either words or imaginary forms, but both are not at the same time necessary. Thinking in the narrower sense, that carried out by means of words, is either pure logical reasoning, or it touches the boundary of the perceptible presentations, in order to bring what is thus empirically given and apprehended into connection with clearly thought ideas. It seeks either the idea to which a given perception belongs, or the case which verifies a given idea. In this quality it is action of the discursive faculty, which is, accordingly, the agent between the abstract mode of recognition and that by perception.

PRINCIPLE OF THE SUFFICIENT GROUND OF
KNOWING

Thinking, even in the narrower sense of the word, does not consist in the mere presence or ideas in the consciousness, but in the connection of separation of two or more of them in accordance with the rules of logic. In the judgment thus formed the Principle of the sufficient Ground manifests itself as the Principle of the ground of Knowing, principium rationis sufficientis cognoscendi. It means that a judgment, in order to express a cognition, must have a sufficient ground, when it is said to be true. The ground of truth in a judgment may be of four different kinds :—

- 1 One judgment may be founded on another, and its truth is then said to be logical, or formal. If the latter judgment has material truth, so has the former. The comparison of two judgments on which the truth of one of them is founded may be made either directly, by mere conversion or opposition ; or by the intermediation of a third. The second operation is the complete syllogism. Logic is nothing more than the application of the Principle of the sufficient Ground in the comparison of judgments with one another. It is erroneous to assume that judgments founded on

the four known laws of thought have "inner" or "immediate" truth; for all truth consists in referring a judgment to something outside itself.

2 A presentation of the first class, that is, a perception produced through the senses, can be the ground of a judgment. The truth of the latter is then said to be material, or empirical, inasmuch as it is immediately founded on experience.

3 The *à priori* forms of the sensibility and intelligence, as the conditions of the possibility of experience, may be the ground of a judgment, which is then a synthetic *à priori* one. Such a judgment has transcendental truth.

For example:—Two straight lines cannot enclose a space; nothing happens without a cause; $3 \times 7 = 21$; matter can neither be created nor destroyed.

4 The formal conditions of all thinking may be the ground of a judgment, which has then "metalogical" truth. These judgments are the four laws of thought. They are the result of an induction arrived at by observing the conditions under which the mind performs its operations, and their truth is proved by the impossibility of thinking otherwise, just as it would be impossible to bend a joint in a direction opposed to its natural one. If the subject could recognise

itself, these laws would be recognised directly without the help of objects, whereas they first come into our consciousness through the latter. For instance, we cannot convince ourselves of the impossibility of a change taking place without a preceding cause until we apply an objective test, although it has its root in our intelligence.

THE THIRD CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT AND
THE FORM OF THE PRINCIPLE OF THE
SUFFICIENT GROUND PREVAILING IN IT

The *à priori* perceptions of the forms of the outer and inner sense, Space and Time, constitute this class. As pure perceptions, considered apart from the complete presentations, they are objects of the faculty of presentation, since even pure points and lines can only be *à priori* perceived, and not represented. The endless extension and divisibility of Space and Time are objects of pure perception only.

What distinguishes this class of presentations from the first, in which Space and Time in combination are perceived, is the "matter" in the latter. Accordingly matter may be described as the perceptibility of Space and Time, or causality objectified. On the other hand, causality, the

form of the intelligence, is not by itself an object of the faculty of presentation, but comes first into consciousness with the material part of the cognition.

Space and Time have the quality that their parts are so related to one another that each is conditioned and determined by the other. The relation in Space is called position, in Time sequence. These relations cannot be understood by the intelligence or by the reason, but by a pure *à priori* perception. What is right and left, above and below, before and after, cannot be explained by mere abstract ideas. The law in accordance with which the parts of Time and Space determine their material relations is the "Principle of the sufficient Ground of Being," *principium rationis sufficientis essendi*. The insight into this ground may become a ground of Knowing, just as the insight into the law of causality and its application to a particular case may be the ground of knowing the effect. Nevertheless the difference between the ground of Being, Becoming, and Knowing holds good. In many cases that which is consequence in accordance with one form of the Principle may be ground according to the other. Thus the effect is often ground of Knowing the cause.

From the manner in which the parts of Space limit one another, it is a matter of indifference which is regarded as determined, and which as determining. This is a consequence of the fact that there is no succession in Space ; for it is only by the combination of Space and Time that the conception of simultaneity arises. Space being unlimited, there is, accordingly, no end to the chain of grounds of Being, either *à parte ante*, or *à parte post*. All possible relative Spaces are figures, because they are limited ; and all these figures, since they have common boundaries, have their ground of Being in one another, and the series *rationum essendi* in Space extends in infinitum in all directions. A proof of all this is impossible ; for its truth has its ground in the *à priori* perception of Space.

The whole of Geometry rests on the nexus of the parts of Space, and the proof of every proposition, although carried out in accordance with logical rules, must eventually depend on the perception of a particular nexus.

In Time, every moment is determined by the preceding one. We can only arrive at the former through the latter. On this nexus of the parts of Time rests all calculation, the words of which only serve to mark the steps of the succession. Every

number presupposes the preceding ones as the ground of its Being ; and it is only by this insight into the ground of Being that we know that where there are ten there are also eight, six, four.

FOURTH CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT, AND THE FORM OF THE PRINCIPLE OF THE SUFFICIENT GROUND PREVAILING IN IT

This class includes only one object for everybody, viz., the immediate object of the inner sense, the subject of willing, which is object for the recognising subject. It is only given to the inner sense, and, therefore, can only appear in Time, not in Space.

Every cognition presupposes subject and object. Accordingly, self-consciousness is not merely simple, but is subdivided, like the consciousness of other things, into what is perceived and what perceives it. What is here perceived or recognised is the will, not the subject itself, for the latter, as the necessary correlate of all presentations, is a condition of these, and cannot, therefore, become an object itself. To say, as is commonly done, "I know that I know," is a tautology, which becomes manifest when one tries to think how it is possible to know something without being

aware of it. It may be asked :—" If we do not know the subject, how do we recognise its different sources of cognition, viz., sensibility, intelligence, reason? " These are not known to us through the act of cognition becoming an object ; otherwise there would not be so many differences of opinion regarding them as there are. They are merely general expressions for the different classes of presentations, and, as necessary correlates of these, stand in the same relation to them as the subject in general does to the object in general. The ignoring of this relation is the origin of the dispute between realism and idealism. Starting from cognition, it may be said that " I know " is an analytical proposition, and " I will " on the contrary, a synthetic *à posteriori* one, being derived from inner experience.

On introspective examination we always find ourselves as willing. To this extent the subject is an object for us. The identity of the subject of willing with the knowing subject is the riddle of the universe, and unexplainable. The inner sense, or self-consciousness in general, is the subjective correlate of this fourth class of objects, as the intelligence is of the first, the reason that of the second, and the sensibility that of the third. The Principle of the sufficient Ground appears here as

the "Principle of the sufficient Ground of Action," principium rationis sufficientis agendi, or the law of motivation ; for we are entitled to ask the reason for every resolution or action. Motivation is thus causality seen from within, and the action will always result in accordance with the empirical character of the individual.

The influence of the will on cognition depends on the identity of the willing and knowing subject, inasmuch as it compels the latter to direct its attention to a particular train of thought. In this it is directed by the law of motivation, in accordance with which it is also the secret director of the association of ideas. The process of association itself is nothing but the application of the Principle of the sufficient Ground in its four forms to the subjective course of our thoughts, but it is the will that sets the whole machinery in motion.

NECESSITY

The Principle of the sufficient Ground in all its forms is the only principle and the only bearer of all necessity. For necessity has no other meaning than the inevitability of the consequence when the ground is assumed.

Accordingly, necessity is conditioned, and

“absolute” necessity is a *contradictio in adjecto*. It cannot be defined as “that of which the non-existence is impossible ;” for all existence is only given empirically, and therefore, only possible inasmuch as a ground is present from which it follows. In accordance with the four forms of the Principle of the sufficient Ground there are four sorts of necessity :—

- 1 *Logical*, according to the Principle of the Ground of Knowing. If the premises are granted, the conclusion must necessarily follow.
- 2 *Physical*, according to the law of Causality. As soon as the cause has set in the effect cannot fail to appear also.
- 3 The *Mathematical*, according to the Principle of Ground of Being. Every relation expressed by a true geometrical proposition must be as stated by it and every accurate calculation irrefutable.
- 4 The *Moral*, in accordance with which the action of every body under the influence of a given motive depends on his inborn character.

Every science has one of the forms of the Principle of the Sufficient Ground for its principal guide.

In pure Mathematics, the chief guide is the ground of Being, although the proof is conducted

in accordance with the ground of Knowing ; in the applied, the law of Causality comes into play. This law predominates in Physics, Chemistry, Geology, etc. The Principle of the ground of Knowing finds application in all sciences ; for in all the particular is recognized from the general. It is the principal guide in Botany, Zoology, Mineralogy, and other classifying sciences. The law of motivation is the chief guide in History, Politics, Pragmatic Psychology, etc., when all maxims and motives are regarded as a datum from which action may be explained ; and in Ethics when the origin and value of motives and maxims are the object of investigation.

SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF THE SUFFICIENT GROUND

- 1 It is the form of all our Knowledge, and the principle of all explanation and necessity.
- 2 It is a single root manifesting itself in four different forms for the four classes of objects of cognition.
- 3 Objects of the first class are bound together by the law of causality, and form an infinite series *à parte ante*, in which each state is de-

pendent on another which preceded it, and which is its cause.

- 4 Objects of the second class, the judgments, are proved to be true by being traced to something outside themselves ; and their truth is either logical, empirical, transcendental, or meta-logical.
- 5 The position of objects in Space is determined by mutual limitation of its parts, and every moment in Time by the preceding one.
- 6 Our experience of the fourth class of objects, the subject of willing, is determined by the law of motivation, in accordance with which the reaction of each individual to a given motive depends on his empirical character.
- 7 Accordingly, all things constituting the sum total of our experience have only a relative existence, and each exists for, or in consequence of, something else of the same sort.

CHAPTER VII

THE TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIK

KANT summed up the part played by sensibility by saying that through it "the perception is given." Neglecting to consider how the sensation is converted into this perception, he assumes that the latter is not real experience of the corresponding object, because it has merely subjective validity and may be different for different persons. To have objective and necessary generality, it is necessary that it should express a quality of the object without any reference to the subject. The problem now to be solved is :—"How is this judgment of perception, which is all that is given by sensibility, to be converted into a judgment of experience, which must be valid for everybody?"

The preconceived idea which determined his answer to this question is, that, as the empirical perception has the *à priori* perception of Space and Time as its condition, so the empirically acquired ideas presuppose the existence of pure

à priori ideas in our cognitive faculty. In other words, the real empirical thinking is only rendered possible by a pure à priori thinking, which has no objects in itself, but must take them from the perception. This led him to the consideration of the process of thinking, which he variously defines as:—"The act of referring a given perception to its object ;" "the faculty of rules" ; or "the faculty of ideas." As the latter have to do with judgments, he classified these into four sorts, each with three subordinate varieties. The twelve different functions of the thinking faculty disclosed in the twelve judgments are the Categories, or à priori ideas, which are necessary for the "thinking" of the object, whose "perception" is dependent on the à priori forms of the sensibility. Thus a pure thinking corresponds to a pure perception. The difficulty now arose of explaining how an empirical perception, which is of totally different nature from à priori ideas of the understanding, could be subsumed under the latter. For the application of the categories to phenomena, therefore, something is required which, while having nothing empirical in it, is on one side intellectual and on the other sensual. This is the "transcendental schema," and there is one corresponding to each category, for the

purpose of connecting it with the object. Hence the categories can have no other than a possible empirical use, and they simply serve to subject phenomena to general rules of synthesis. The meaning of this, in plain language, is that we can have no experience of objects until they are united together by the same rules that determine the union of all consciousness in a single original apperception. In other words, the laws of nature so far as their form is concerned, must conform to *à priori* laws of our understanding ; for otherwise we could have no empirical experience. According to this theory of cognition, the "object-in-itself" is distinct from the perception on one side and from the "thing-in-itself" on the other, which is totally beyond the reach of our cognition ; and a dog could have no experience of a bone until he had brought into play the complex machinery of the categories with their schemata. Kant tried to steer a middle course between Locke and Leibnitz, objecting to the former that he made cognition exclusively the work of the senses, and to the latter that he went into the opposite extreme of attributing everything to the intellect. Before proceeding to Kant's deduction of the categories I will now give his table of the judgments, the

corresponding table of the categories, and finally the pure physiological table of the general principles of the science of nature.

LOGICAL TABLE OF THE JUDGMENTS

- | | |
|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1. According to Quantity. | |
| General | |
| Particular | |
| Singular | |
| 2. According to Quality. | 3. According to Relation. |
| Affirmative | Categorical |
| Negative | Hypothetical |
| Endless | Disjunctive |
| 4. According to Modality. | |
| Problematical | |
| Affirmative | |
| Apodictic | |

TABLE OF THE CATEGORIES

- | | |
|---------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1. According to Quantity. | |
| Unity | (Measure) |
| Multiplicity | (Magnitude) |
| Totality | (The Whole) |
| 2. According to Quality. | 3. Relation. |
| Reality | Substance |
| Negation | Cause |
| Limitation | Community (Reciprocal action) |
| 4. Modality. | |
| Possibility | |
| Existence (Reality) | |
| Necessity | |

PURE PHYSIOLOGICAL TABLE OF THE GENERAL
PRINCIPLES OF THE SCIENCE OF NATURE

- | | |
|--|--------------------------------|
| 1. Axioms
of Perception (<i>Anschauung</i>) | |
| 2. Anticipations
of perception (<i>Wahrnehmung</i>) | 3. Analogies
of Experience. |
| 4. Postulates
of empirical thinking in general | |

Of the four classes into which the categories are divided the first two, which refer to objects of perception (pure as well as empirical), are called the "mathematical;" the two others, which are directed to the existence of these objects (either in relation to one another or to the understanding), the "dynamical."

That each class should have three subdivisions, whereas all division through *à priori* ideas must be by dichotomy, is explained by the fact that the third is formed by the combination of the other two. For example, "totality" is nothing but "multiplicity" regarded as "unity;" "limitation," nothing but "reality" combined with "negation," and so for the others. Nevertheless the combination of the first with the second requires a special operation of the understanding which is different from that exercised in the first and second.

The physiological table contains the rules for the application of the categories to experience, the first two—the mathematical—depending on a synthesis of the “homogeneous,” by which magnitudes in extension and degree are respectively determined.

CHAPTER VIII

THE DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES

By the "Transcendental deduction" of the categories Kant means the explanation of the manner in which *à priori* ideas can be applied to objects and prescribe their legality to the latter, although not derived from them. An empirical deduction would simply explain how an idea is derived from experience and reflection on it, and, therefore, only concerns the operation by which the idea is acquired.

To understand what follows it is necessary to take particular notice of the assumption that underlies the whole of Kant's theory of cognition. This assumption is, that "all experience contains, in addition to the perception of the senses, an abstract idea of an object which is given in the perception; therefore ideas of objects in general, underlie, as conditions *à priori*, all cognition through experience." The formation of the "abstract idea" of an object being a thinking operation, it would necessarily follow that the

objective validity of the categories, as *à priori* ideas, depends on the fact that experience is only possible through them. This he tries to prove in the following manner, commencing from below upwards :—

There are three subjective sources of cognition, on which the possibility of experience generally and of the recognition of objects of experience depends, viz., Sensibility, Imagination,¹ and Apperception. The part played by the sensibility is a mere passive one—receptivity. Sensation combined with consciousness is perception. The consciousness of ourselves arising from the perception of our inner states is empirical, liable to fluctuations, and without any stability. This empirical consciousness, called the inner sense, or empirical apperception, does not give the conception of the necessary numerical identity of the ego through its various perceptions, because the character of necessity cannot be obtained from empirical sources. For this there must be an original and transcendental condition of the synthesis, and this condition is the “transcendental apperception,” or the unity of consciousness which precedes all data of experience. In other

Einbildungskraft. The meaning must be inferred from the function assigned to it.

words, the union of presentations in a single subject is accidental and subjective ; the union in a general consciousness necessary and objective. Now, as every object contains a "manifold," which gives rise to separate and scattered perceptions, it is necessary that the latter should be bound together. The part played by the sensibility being mere receptivity, the synthesis of the manifold must be effected by an active faculty, and this faculty is the "imagination."

But the synthesis would not be accompanied by the consciousness of the numerical identity of the ego if there was not an objective ground for compelling it to be carried out in a way that would render it possible for the different perceptions to be combined in one consciousness. This ground is the "affinity" of the perceptions, and can only be found in the principle of the unity of the apperception in regard to all cognition. To understand Kant's idea here, it is necessary to remember that, according to him, the empirical judgment, which would be the result of a synthesis effected by the imagination alone, has no value as experience unless guided by prescribed *a priori* rules. Take, for example, the empirical judgment, "the body is heavy." The synthesis of the ideas of body and weight has no objective validity

unless it carries with it the necessary unity of apperception in the process ; for otherwise I could only say :—"When I carry the body I feel a pressure of weight." This would not justify me in saying "the body is heavy" independently of my subjective states. The *à priori* rules in accordance with which the synthesis must take place are the categories. Hence the latter prescribe their legality to objects through the intervention of the imagination, and by directing the synthesis of the latter.

The deduction from above downwards would run as follows :—The original unity of apperception, the consciousness of the numerical identity of the ego through all its presentations, is a necessary condition of actual knowledge of the latter. Therefore the manifold must be so combined as to give this necessary unity of consciousness, that is to say in accordance with a transcendental principle of unity. The unity of the manifold presupposes a synthesis, and this must be *à priori*, as the unity itself is so. Thus the transcendental unity of apperception determines an *à priori* synthesis of the imagination as a condition of the possibility of combining the manifold in a cognition. The synthesis is transcendental when it has to do with the combination of the

manifold *à priori* without distinction of the perceptions, and the unity of the synthesis is transcendental when it is represented as *à priori* necessarily related to the original unity of apperception. Therefore the transcendental unity of the synthesis of the imagination is the pure form of the cognition. The unity of the apperception in relation to the synthesis of the imagination is the "understanding," and the same unity in relation to the transcendental synthesis is the pure understanding. Therefore the latter contains *à priori* cognitions which imply the necessary unity of the pure synthesis of the imagination in regard to all possible perceptions. These *à priori* cognitions are the categories.

Having assigned to the imagination the function of connecting the perception at one end with the pure apperception at the other, he found it necessary to assume the "schemata" as a product *à priori* of the pure imagination, in order to be able to apply pure *à priori* ideas to actual experience. As their untenability will be shown under their criticism, it is unnecessary to waste time over his attempted elucidation of them.

Finally, the fourth, or physiological table, contains the rules for the application of the categories to experience. They are synthetic *à*

priori judgments derived from à prior ideas by aid of the à priori perception of the formal possibility of experience in general. It has been already explained that an idea can only extend our knowledge by having recourse to a perception, either empirical or à priori. In the latter case it would have no validity beyond the limits of possible experience.

CHAPTER IX

CRITICISM OF THE DEDUCTION

- 1 KANT makes a false assumption as to what constitutes experience. The empirical perception itself is experience. The intelligence, by means of its only function (*à priori* cognition of the law of causality), refers the sensation to its cause, which then presents itself in Time and Space (the *à priori* forms of perception) as an object of experience. The neglect to give any theory of the origin of perception, which he identified with mere sensation combined with the forms of Space and Time, caused Kant to overlook the true proof of the *à priori* of the law of causality, viz., that experience is only possible through it.
- 2 If experience of an object depended on the thinking faculty applying to it twelve different *à priori* ideas, every real thing would have a number of determinations belonging essentially to its existence which it would be impossible to think away, and which would not be derived from the qualities of Time and Space. But there

is only one such determination, viz., that of causality. On this depends materiality, the essence of which is action. Apart from the matter there are no determinations in the thing but those of Space and Time, or its empirical qualities, which all depend on its action and which are, therefore, nearer determinations of causality.

- 3** Kant does not explain what the "manifold" of the perception is before the synthesis effected by thinking faculty. But Space and Time are continua, that is, their parts are originally combined. Being the complete forms of our perception, everything presents itself in them as a continuum, and no synthesis of the parts is required.

If by the "synthesis of the manifold" is meant that I refer the different sensual impressions from an object to this one thing, that is, for instance, if I look at a bell, and recognise as one body that which affects my eye as yellow, my hands as hard and smooth, my ears as sounding, this is rather a consequence of the *à priori* recognition of the causal nexus, by means of which the different impressions on my organs of sense lead me to a common cause of them, viz., the quality of the body before me. The "imagination," therefore, does not exist as a special faculty of synthesis.

- 4 According to Kant we have only abstract ideas of objects, not perceptions. On the contrary, we have perceptions of the objects first, and the ideas are formed by abstraction from them. This process of abstraction is the function of the thinking faculty.
- 5 Kant says that the thinking faculty makes nature possible by prescribing *a priori* laws to which it must adapt itself. But nature is in reality a perception not an abstraction.
- 6 The unity of apperception is simply the subject of cognition, the correlate of all our presentations.
- 7 If Kant's distinction between subjective and objective judgments held good, no judgment of general objective validity would be possible in Chemistry, and there would, consequently, be no science of Chemistry.
- 8 The functions of the thinking faculty in forming judgments are discovered empirically, and their completeness is inferred from induction.

CHAPTER X

CRITICISM OF THE JUDGMENTS AND CATEGORIES

- 1 THE quantity. The ideas, the relation of which is expressed in a judgment, have a sphere or circumference, the larger including the smaller. The latter can, therefore, be separated either as an undetermined part of the former, or completely. The judgment in the former case is "particular," in the latter "general." For example :—

"Some trees bear nuts,"

"All oaks bear nuts."

The operation in both is manifestly the same, the difference depending solely on the resources of the language.

The "individual" judgment is in reality a general one. "Socrates" is equivalent to "all Socrates."

The "Quantity" has, therefore, only two forms. These have their origin in the laws of identity and contradiction, and do not reveal distinct operations, functions, or categories of

the understanding which render experience possible.

- 2 The quality. The nature of abstract ideas implies the possibility of combining or separating their spheres, and on this possibility depend the laws of identity and contradiction. There are, therefore, only two forms, the "affirmative" and "negative," which have their origin solely in the thinking faculty, but no analogue or correlate in the perception.
- 3 Relation. This combines judgments in the "hypothetical" form, and separates them in the "disjunctive."

According to Kant the hypothetical judgment in general has its origin in the understanding and its category of causality. As already shown, it is the abstract expression of the Principle of the sufficient Ground, and the law of causality is only one of the forms of the latter. As the Principle has four different forms, each concerning a distinct class of objects, and arising from a distinct cognitive faculty, and as each form has, nevertheless, the hypothetical form of judgment for its expression, we see how cognitions which are quite different in their origin and significance appear in the same form of combination of ideas and judgments when thought of in abstracto.

Therefore Kant's method of discovering the elements and the nature of the intuitive perception from the stand-point of the abstract cognition was an absurd one.

The categorical judgment is, strictly speaking, the form of the judgment in general; for the hypothetical and disjunctive forms are applied to ready-made judgments, in which the combination of the ideas remains categorical, the former expressing their dependence on one another, the latter their incompatibility. Mere ideas have only one sort of relation to one another, viz., that which is expressed in the categorical judgment. The nearer determination of this relation may be "affirmation" or "denial," out of which Kant has made other categories under the title of quality. The relation has other sub-varieties according to the extent to which the sphere of one idea includes that of the other. This determination constitutes the quantity of the judgments, out of which Kant made another class of categories. The truth of judgments being, as already explained, of four different kinds, we see how different may be the cognitions which can be represented in abstracto by the connection of the spheres of two ideas as subject and predicate, and that no single function of the understanding can

be put forward as corresponding to them and producing them. Here again it appears how absurd it is to begin with the abstract cognition for the purpose of analysing the intuitive.

Kant assumes that the subject and predicate of a judgment have each a special correlate in the perception, viz., "substance" and "accidence." But the idea of the substance has no other content than that of matter, and accidents are equivalent to special modes of action; so that the supposed recognition of substance and accidence is always that of cause and effect.

The disjunctive judgments spring from the law of "the excluded middle."

The attempt to deduce the category of "Community" or "reciprocal action" from them is a very far-fetched idea. The two things are, in fact, diametrically opposed. In "reciprocal action" the granting of one of two things necessarily implies the granting of the other, whereas in a disjunctive judgment the granting of one involves the exclusion of the other. The proof that there is no such thing as reciprocal action has been already given under the Principle of sufficient Ground.

4 *Modality.*

The Categories of "possibility," "reality," and

"necessity" really gives rise to the problematical, affirmative and apodictic forms of judgment, but they have their origin in the Principle of the sufficient Ground. The idea of necessity is directly derived from this, since it has no other meaning than the inevitable following of the consequence from a given cause; and by the application of reflection to necessity arise the ideas of possibility, impossibility, reality and fortuitousness.

Everything is necessary in relation to its cause, but accidental in relation to everything else. Therefore the expression "absolutely accidental" is just as absurd as "absolutely necessary." Everything in nature, so far as this is a perception, is necessary, because it arises from its cause. If we regard this one thing in relation to the rest, we recognise it as accidental. This is an abstract reflection. If we now further abstract from every relation of an object to the rest, we acquire the idea of "reality" in which only the effect is considered without any reference to cause. But, as everything in nature proceeds from a cause, all that is real is also necessary, that is, in so far as it is in this place at this time. If, however, we pass to thinking, abstracting from every definite place and time, we can present

to ourselves, by means of reflection, all the laws of nature that are known to us either *à priori* or *à posteriori*, and so acquire the idea of "possibility." What has here no place is the "impossible." It is obvious that possibility and impossibility are for the abstract recognition, not for the perceptible. Hence there is no ground for Kant's assumption of three functions of the understanding for the three ideas of necessity, possibility and reality.

Since all apodictic judgments depend on the Principle of the sufficient Ground, they are in their origin and ultimate significance hypothetical. They become categorical through the advent of an affirmative minor, that is, in the conclusion. If the minor is undecided, the judgment is problematical.

CHAPTER XI

CRITICISM OF THE SCHEMATISMUS

HAVING sought to find an *à priori* cognitive faculty corresponding to every empirical one, Kant remarked that, in order to make sure that we are not leaving the solid ground of perception, we often refer back from the empirical abstract idea to the latter. The temporary representative of the idea thus called forth, and which is never fully adequate to it, he calls a "schema," in contradistinction to the complete image. He now maintains that, as such a schema stands between the empirical idea and the clear sensual perception, so also similar ones stand between the *à priori* perceptive faculty of the sensibility and the *à priori* thinking faculty of the pure understanding. To each category, accordingly, corresponds a special schema. But Kant overlooks the fact that, in the case of the empirically acquired ideas, we refer back to the perception from which they have obtained their content, whereas the *à priori* ideas, which have as

yet no content, come to the perception from within in order to receive something from it. They have, therefore, nothing to which they can refer back, and the analogy with the empirical schema falls to the ground. It has been already shown, besides, that the schema is not of the nature assumed by Kant.

CHAPTER XII

CRITICISM OF THE "PURE PHYSIOLOGICAL TABLE
OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SCIENCE
OF NATURE"

1

Axioms of the perception (*Anschauung*). Principle of the pure understanding:— "All objects are, so far as their perception is concerned, magnitudes in extension."

According to this, the extensive magnitude of an object is made to depend on the "quantity" of a judgment. As Space and Time underlie all objects, the latter can only be apprehended by the same synthesis of the manifold through which the presentation of a definite Space or Time is produced, that is, through the combination of the homogeneous and the consciousness of the synthetic unity of this manifold. But this consciousness in a perception generally, whereby the presentation of an object is rendered possible, is the idea of extensive magnitude. In other words, the synthesis of two ideas in a judgment is determined by an *à priori* synthesis of the

manifold which gives the idea of magnitude, or the category of magnitude, and the object must adapt itself to this.

2 It is obvious, however, from what has been said regarding the nature of judgments, that the quantity of the latter has nothing to do with the magnitude in extension of an object of perception. Magnitude depends on the fact that Space is the form of our outer perception.

The anticipations of perception (*Wahrnehmung*). "The sensation and the reality that corresponds to it in the object have an intensive magnitude or degree."

The reality and its negation in an object are here made to depend on the "quality" of a judgment, that is, on the inclusion of one idea in another, or its exclusion from it. As sensation has all grades down to the vanishing point, when nothing but a formal *à priori* consciousness of the manifold in Time and Space remains, there is a synthesis of the production of intensity from pure perception = 0 to any given magnitude; that is to say, the sensation has an "intensive" magnitude. But, as the apprehension through sensation fills only one moment, this synthesis cannot be effected through sensation alone. Therefore the quality of having a degree can be

recognised *à priori*, and this is effected by the category of reality, while the category of negation determines the opposite.

According to Kant, then, the reality in an object must have a degree which can be anticipated, otherwise no experience of it could be derived from sensation.

The fact is that the intensity of a sensation is a subjective perception depending on the quality of the organs of sense.

The two next Principles—the dynamical—refer to the existence of objects and their relation to
3 one another in regard to this existence.

The analogies of experience.

The general Principle of these is, that “the relations of all objects in regard to their existence are determined by *à priori* rules.”

A. First Analogy. Principle of Persistence.

“All objects contain the persistent (substance), and the changeable as its determination, that is, a mode of existence of the object.” Kant derives this great metaphysical truth from the category of “Subsistence” and “Inherence” which we know from the form of the categorical judgment, but the proof which he here gives puts this aside, and he tries, instead, to derive it from the pure perception of Time. He says :—

“Time, in which all change of objects must be thought, remains and does not change; because it is only in it that simultaneity or sequence, as their determinations, can be presented. Therefore there must be a substratum in objects of perception which presents time generally, and in which change and simultaneity can be perceived by the relations of the objects to it.”

It is false to say that Time remains and does not change. It is also false that there is either simultaneity or duration in mere Time. These ideas arise from the combination of Space and Time, as already proved. A little further on Kant contradicts himself by saying that “simultaneity is not a *modus* of time, in which no parts are simultaneous but all after one another.” The real proof of the persistence of matter is that the law of causality, which is known to us *à priori*, only concerns changes or successive states of matter, leaving the latter untouched, which, therefore, remains in our consciousness as the everlasting foundation of all things.

Another proof has been given, viz., that matter is causality, and as such, combines the qualities of Space and Time in itself. The persistence follows from the share taken by Space in the matter.

B. Second Analogy. Principle of Production.

"Everything that happens presupposes something on which it follows in accordance with a rule."

The relation of the Category of causality to the hypothetical form of judgment has been already discussed, as also the false assumptions made by Kant, that cause and effect are simultaneous, and that all sequence is consequence.

C. Third analogy. Principle of Community.

"All substances, in so far as they are simultaneous, have a reciprocal action on one another."

It has been already proved that there is no such thing as reciprocal action, and that the attempt to connect it with the disjunctive form of judgment is an absurdity.

The Postulates of empirical thinking in general :

a. That which agrees with the formal conditions of experience is "possible."

b. That which is connected with the material conditions of experience (sensation) is "real."

c. That which has its connection with the real determined according to the general conditions of experience is "necessary."

These Postulates have been already discussed under the categories of modality.

CHAPTER XIII

THE TRANSCENDENTAL DIALEKTIK

GENERAL logic is a "canon" for the determination of the formal truth of our cognitions, that is, of their agreement with the general and formal laws of the understanding and reason. If employed as an "organ" for the determination of material truth, it is called "Dialektik," or logic of "deception." The "Transcendental Analytik" was, according to Kant, the logic of truth, and gave synthetic *à priori* cognitions, or rules, because these were only applied to objects of possible experience. This use of rules is said to be "immanent," in contradistinction to "transcendent," which would be the use of them beyond the bounds of experience. The second part of the Transcendental Logic, which is a criticism of the dialectical deception of making a transcendental use of rules derived from *à priori* ideas, is called the "Transcendental Dialektik."

Kant defined the understanding as the faculty of "rules." He now defines reason as the faculty

of "Principles." As he assumed the former to have a mere logical or formal use, and corresponding *a priori* cognitions, so he assumes the latter to have a logical use and also a real one, inasmuch as it contains the source of certain ideas which it does not borrow from the senses or the understanding. A "principle" is, accordingly, a synthetic cognition derived from a mere idea, whereas "rules" of the understanding would not be possible without the aid of the conditions of a possible experience in general. Now the logical use of the reason, that of syllogising, consists in drawing a conclusion by subsuming its condition (contained in the minor premise) under a general rule (contained in the major). The latter requires that its condition should be again sought (in a prosyllogism), and so on, as far as possible. Thus the peculiar principle of reason in general, in its logical use, is to find the unconditioned ground of the cognition of the understanding, which latter is in itself conditioned. It is assumed that the totality (*universitas*) of the conditions in the perception corresponds to the generality (*universalitas*) in the major premise.

This logical maxim can only become a principle of pure reason if we assume that "when the con-

ditioned is given, so must also the total series of its conditions, and, consequently, the unconditioned." The Transcendental Analytik was an attempt to prove that the mere logical form of our cognition contains the source of pure *à priori* ideas (the categories) to determine the synthetic unity that makes an empirical knowledge of objects possible. The problem for the reason is:—"Does the logical form of the syllogism also contain the source of special *à priori* ideas (transcendental ideas), which, when applied to the synthetic unity of perceptions determined by the categories, determine the use of the understanding, in the totality of experience, in accordance with "Principles?" Such *à priori* ideas would be the totality of conditions to something given as conditioned. As the unconditioned alone makes the totality of conditions possible, and the totality of the conditions is itself always unconditioned, a "transcendental idea" may be defined as "the idea of the unconditioned, in so far as it contains the ground of the synthesis of the conditioned."

From the category of "relation" spring three varieties of syllogism for expressing the relation between a cognition and its condition, represented by the major premise as the rule, viz.,

the "categorical," the "hypothetical," and the "disjunctive," to each of which there is assumed to be a corresponding transcendental idea. The first would be the unconditioned of the categorical synthesis in a subject ; the second that of the hypothetical synthesis of the terms of a series ; the third that of the disjunctive synthesis of the parts in a system. The logical synthesis in each case is, of course, conditioned. The transcendental ideas, having to do with the unconditioned synthetic unity of all conditions generally, are, accordingly, divisible into three classes :—

1. The absolute unity of the thinking subject.
2. The absolute unity of the series of conditions of empirical objects.
3. The absolute unity of the condition of all objects of thought in general.

Thus pure reason gives the idea to a Transcendental Psychology (*Psychologia rationalis*), to a Transcendental Cosmology (*Cosmologia rationalis*), and to a Transcendental recognition of God (*Theologia Transcendentalis*).

The contention is that the reason, through the exercise of the same function that it employs in arriving at the categorical form of conclusion, must necessarily come to the idea of the absolute unity of the thinking subject, and so for the

others. An objective deduction of the transcendental ideas being obviously impossible, Kant considers that he has given a satisfactory subjective deduction of them by taking for granted, as has been already stated, that the syllogistic process indicates a necessity for seeking the sum total of conditions. But, as transcendental ideas cannot be verified in concreto, the conclusions by which they are arrived at are sophistical and the object of the Transcendental Dialektik is to reveal the source of the deception.

The fallacy of the conclusion in the first case consists in deducing the absolute unity of the subject, of which we can have no idea, from its transcendental idea, which contains no manifold. This is called a transcendental "Paralogism."

In the second we deduce, from the fact that we have always a self-contradictory idea of the unconditioned synthetic unity of the series on one side, the necessity of the opposite unity, of which we have also no idea.

This is the "Antinomy" of pure reason.

In the third we deduce, from the totality of the conditions of thinking objects generally, so far as they are given us, the absolute synthetic unity of all conditions of the possibility of things in general ; that is, from things of which we have

no transcendental idea we deduce a Being of all Beings of which we know still less from any transcendental idea.

This sophistical conclusion is the "Ideal" of pure reason.

CHAPTER XIV

CRITICISM OF THE DIALEKTIK

ALTHOUGH the claim made for pure reason, that it "requires the totality of the conditions, and, consequently, the unconditioned, when anything conditioned is given," has been proved by Kant himself to be no justification for drawing certain conclusions from it, it is necessary to show that there is no foundation whatever for the claim.

Kant's Principle assumes that the conditions constitute a series. This is false ; for the totality of conditions to something conditioned must be contained in its next ground, from which it immediately results, and which is, therefore, its "sufficient Ground." All the different determinations of a state that constitute a cause must have come together before the effect follows. The series, or chain of causes, only arises because we regard that which is now a condition as itself again conditioned, so that the whole operation begins anew and the Principle of the sufficient Ground appears with its claim for the "complete-

ness" of the next condition, not for that of a series. It is never a successive series, but an alternate one of conditioned and conditions. Only through an arbitrary abstraction can a series of causes and effects be taken for a series of mere causes. When we leave the things themselves and make use of abstract ideas of them, the chain of alternate causes and effects, or of alternate logical grounds and sequences, is taken for a chain of mere causes or grounds of the last effect, and the completeness of the conditions, through which the ground becomes sufficient, appears as a completeness of the assumed series of mere grounds, which are supposed to be necessary for the last consequence. To recognise the inadmissibility of this no criticism of the reason by means of antinomies and their solution is necessary, but an investigation of the relation between abstract and intuitive cognition, by descending from the indefinite generality of the former to the fixed definiteness of the latter, when it will appear that the essence of reason does not consist in a requirement of the unconditioned. The reason can, as a faculty of cognition, have to do solely with objects. But all object for the subject comes under the Principle of the sufficient Ground, both *à parte ante* and *à parte post*, and it is utterly

impossible to objectively represent anything that does not demand a "why." This is an *à priori* certainty, and, therefore, there is no such thing as an "absolute." That it does not lie in the nature of reason to go back to an unconditioned cause is evident from the fact that the two religions with the greatest number of followers in the world, Brahminism and Buddhism, do not know of any such claim.

Kant's deduction of the Principle is a shallow sophism. The attempt to subsume a known truth under a more general one is assumed to be a search for the unconditioned, which we presuppose. What we really seek in this attempt is to employ the reason, the faculty of general abstract cognition, for the simplification of our knowledge through a survey or summary of it. For the use of the reason consists in recognising the particular through the general, the case through the rule. The series of the ground of Knowing, which exists only in the province of the abstract, that is, of the reason, comes to an end in the unprovable, that is, in a presentation which is no longer conditioned by this form of the Principle of the sufficient Ground. This presentation is the *à priori* or *à posteriori* immediately perceptible ground of the highest

link of the causal chain. Here the ground of Knowing, as has been explained, passes over into the ground of "Becoming" or "Being."

Kant confounds these different grounds by saying that the totality (*universitas*) of the conditions in the perception corresponds to the generality (*universalitas*) in the major premise.

It is, therefore, radically false, to say that our quest of higher "grounds of Knowing," of general truths, arises from the assumption of an object unconditioned in its essence.

Kant also makes an improper use of Plato's "ideas." The latter referred solely to what is perceptible or visible, while Kant applies the word to what lies beyond all possibility of perception.

In what follows, I propose to deal only with the first class of the transcendental ideas, and with the third antinomy, in which is discussed the vexed question of freedom and empirical necessity.

CHAPTER XV

HUMAN PERSONALITY

THE problem of personality and its survival or non-survival of bodily death was a favourite topic of discussion with the Indian sophists of old ; but their metaphysical abstractions could not enable them to arrive at any definite conclusion. In recent times the Psychic Researchers, containing men distinguished in every department of human knowledge, have turned their attention to empirical methods in the hope of being able to arrive at a scientific induction, which, as they ignorantly imagine, would decide the matter once for all. It is a remarkable fact that not one of those "empirical" thinkers has thought it necessary to state the nature of the problem, or what would be considered a solution of it, while the words "sufficient" and "insufficient" are constantly used by them in regard to the evidence. Kant says :—"If the understanding, while occupied solely with its own empirical use, neglects to reflect on the sources of its knowledge, it

cannot determine what lies within or beyond its sphere. If it cannot distinguish whether certain questions lie within its horizon or not, it is never sure of its claims and of what it possesses, but must reckon on many humiliating reproofs when it inevitably oversteps the limits of its province, and gets involved in deception and delusion." The result is that the Researchers of to-day are as far from agreement as were the sophists of India, and that one of the most distinguished men of science can make the ridiculous statement :—"That the partition between this world and the next is growing thin at places, and the sounds of the hammer may already be heard from the other side." Kant has given irrefragable proof that the thinking subject can only be known by its empirical manifestations, that any induction arrived at in this way can never bring with it the conviction of necessity, and that the subject itself must remain as great a mystery as the metaphysical problem with which the physicist always finds himself confronted in his investigation of matter. It is strange that the spiritualists, while showing a good deal of impatience because their views are not unreservedly accepted, furnish the most convincing empirical evidence that it is, in the

long run, altogether a matter of faith and of preconceived ideas ; for the most respectable "controls" admit that it is possible to reproduce the appearance and characteristics of a deceased person without the co-operation of the latter, and that the investigator should not accept anything without submitting it to the bar of his own judgment. Seeing, therefore, that empirical methods are of no avail, because they can never yield anything more than a hypothesis which further experience may prove to be erroneous, there remains only the consideration of the arguments of Rational Psychology. Kant, following his usual method of examining every subject in accordance with his classification of the categories, divides these arguments into four "transcendental paralogisms," after pointing out that this pretended science has nothing to build upon but the simple proposition "I think" which is nothing but a consciousness accompanying all our ideas.

1. FIRST PARALOGISM OF SUBSTANTIALITY.

Substance is that of which the presentation is the "absolute subject" of our judgments, and, therefore, cannot be used as the determination of

any other thing. I, as a thinking being, am the "absolute subject" of all my possible judgments, and this presentation of myself cannot be used as the predicate of another thing.

Therefore I am, as a thinking being, "substance."

The inference from this would be that the soul must be persistent, since "substance" is so.

Kant's refutation of the paralogism consists in saying that we must presuppose the persistence of an object of experience before we can apply the empirical idea of substance to it, whereas the ego, the logical subject of our thoughts, although it constantly reappears, has no perception connected with it by which it can be distinguished from other objects of experience. In other words, the subject cannot become object, which would be necessary for the proof of persistence.

Kant gives himself the trouble of refuting the argument by making the false assumption that the idea of substance is derived from the relation between subject and predicate in a categorical judgment, and that something can exist as subject and not as predicate. Nothing exists as subject or predicate, since these expressions are purely logical, and denote the relation of two abstract

ideas to each other. "Substance" and "accidence", on the other hand, belong to the perceptible world and its apprehension, where they are identical with matter and form (quality).

The contrast which has given rise to the assumption of two radically different substances, body and soul is that between the objective and subjective. If we contemplate ourselves in external perception, we find a body in Space. If we contemplate ourselves subjectively, in mere self-consciousness, we find something that wills and presents, free from all the qualities of bodies. Taking knowing, willing, and thinking as effects, and not being able to make the body accountable for these, we seek the cause in something quite distinct from the body, and so deduce the existence of the soul. Here the fallacy is that of confounding the relation between subject and its manifestations with that between cause and effect, which is applicable only to objects. After the idea of an immaterial, simple, indestructible being had arisen in this way, it was developed and demontstated from the idea of substance, after this had been previously formed by the following artifice. What matter is, and how the idea of it arises, has been already explained. Substance is an abstraction formed from this by retaining

the predicate of persistence and thinking away all the other essential qualities, viz., extension, impenetrability, divisibility, etc. Like every higher genus, therefore, the idea substance contains less than the idea matter, and the latter remains the only subordinate species. By an improper use of the process of abstraction the former was co-ordinated with it as a second species after it had been formed for that purpose by omitting all the attributes of matter but one. It is, consequently, far from being a category or necessary function of the understanding, and its only real content lies in the idea of matter.

2. SECOND PARALOGISM OF SIMPLICITY.

That thing of which the action can never be regarded as the concurrence of many acting things, is "simple."

Now the soul, or thinking ego, is such a thing. Therefore, &c.—The gist of this argument is that the unity of the subject is a necessary condition of the possibility of every thought, since the latter consists of several presentations. But the unity of thought is collective and may, so far as ideas are concerned, depend as much on the collective unity of the co-operating substances as on the

absolute unity of the subject. Nor can the inference be drawn from experience, since the subject is not accessible as an object of experience, while the idea of absolute unity is beyond the sphere of the latter. The presentation of the subject must be simple, because we can determine nothing in it; but the simplicity of the presentation is not a recognition of the simplicity of the subject itself. The pretended Cartesian conclusion "*cogito ergo sum*" is a tautology expressing nothing more than the *cogito* (*sum cogitans*).

Kant imposes on himself the unnecessary trouble of giving the above refutation by making the false assumption that "Simplicity" is a quality derived from the affirmation and denial contained in a categorical judgment. Simplicity is a matter of quantity, and has nothing to do with the relation between subject and predicate.

3. THIRD PARALOGISM OF THE PERSONALITY.

That which is conscious of its own numerical identity at different times is a person.

Now the soul is such a thing ;
Therefore the soul is a person.

The identity of the consciousness of myself at different times is only a formal condition of my

thoughts and their connection, but does not prove the numerical identity of my subject. Take, for instance, a row of similar elastic balls, and suppose the first to strike the second. It will communicate its motion and its total state to the latter, and so on through the row. If we now suppose a series of "substances" instead of bodies, and that the first communicates its presentations and its consciousness to the second, and so throughout the row, the last substance would be conscious of all the states of the others as its own, and, nevertheless, not be the same person.

From the standpoint of another no conclusion can be drawn as to persistence, since there is no object of perception. The phenomena of multiple personality brought to light in recent times prove that the consciousness of identity may be interrupted for longer or shorter periods with corresponding changes of empirical character, confirming the impossibility of arriving at any definite conclusion in regard to the subject.

4. FOURTH PARALOGISM OF THE IDEALITY.

(Of the outer relation.)

Kant's object here is to show that the questions regarding the relation between the thinking

subject and matter have their origin in the belief that objects are things in themselves.

It is under this Paralogism that his own false conception of causality comes to light, a mistake which cost him many years of futile labour. The mistake consisted in assuming that the transcendental object, the thing-in-itself, is the cause of the real object, the presentation.

The sum total of what is contained in the refutation of the paralogisms is a statement of the simple fact that the subject can never become an object. If we seek to examine ourselves we require our own subject to recognise what is examined, and so wander in a perpetual circle. If we investigate another person we get nothing but empirical manifestations, his so-called empirical character, which remains fixed and invariable, with a reservation to which I will come later on. This empirical character is the only thing on which we can pretend to ground a conclusion in regard to the persistence of the subject either in this life or after death of the body. If proof were possible in this way spiritualism has given it up to the hilt.

We are now in a position to understand the Buddhist idea of "Nirvana," which is so strangely misunderstood by Christian missionaries of every

sect. I will take for granted the orthodox Christian view that the human soul is an offshoot or emanation of the Divine spirit. These separate offshoots must have been at the commencement in a state of nirvana, and perfectly equal in every respect. They are now hurled into matter, whereby they come under limitations, but with the power and the responsibility of emancipating themselves so that they may get back to the ideal state from which they emerged. The limitations, depending on physical conditions, and on persistence in the delusion that they are desirable, constitute the personality by which one individual is distinguished from another. If an ape were to express the hope of attaining to the highest dignity of manhood, and thought that he could do so without losing his apish character, the absurdity would be apparent; but the "forked radish with curiously carved head," forced by his egoism to "play such fantastic tricks as make the angels weep," and with an infinitely longer course of evolution before him than that which separates him from the ape, thinks that he can arrive at his goal with characteristics which were dependent on temporary conditions, and which made it impossible for him to comply with the first requirement of "loving his neighbour as

himself." To the Buddhist, the personality is the mire in which the subject is sunk, the source of all the trials and sufferings of life, and must be got rid of before the soul can regain its pristine state of happiness.

Since the Buddhist philosophy assumes, and the Kantian proves, that man's empirical character, like everything else in the phenomenal world, is subject to the law of cause and effect, it is interesting to consider, first of all, whether freedom of the will and responsibility are compatible with empirical necessity. The Buddhist takes it for granted without any query whatever, assuming that he has made his own character as it is, and that he can only alter it for the better by self-denial, love of his neighbour, renouncement of all attachment to the world, and resignation. Kant comes to the question in the third antinomy, maintaining that we get the practical idea of freedom from the transcendental idea of an unconditioned cause, while in the "*Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*" he derives it as a necessary presupposition of the "categorical affirmative." In the attempt to reconcile the dispute between "Thesis" and "Antithesis" he involves himself in flagrant self-contradiction by saying that, as every object of perception

has a "thing-in-itself" as its cause, so the empirical character has also a transcendental one as its cause. He had already repeatedly insisted on the fact that the category of causality, like the other categories, had no validity whatever beyond the bounds of possible experience. We apply the law of causality *a priori* and before all experience to the changes in our organs of sense. For this reason it is of subjective origin, just as the sensations are, and, therefore, cannot lead to the thing-in-itself. He assumes the existence of an object whose mode of appearance is determined by our forms of cognition, whereas the existence of object in general is as much conditioned by the existence of a subject in general as the appearance of the object is by the subject's mode of cognition. Consequently, if a thing-in-itself must be assumed, it cannot be an object, but must lie in a totally different province from that of presentation and cannot be reached by way of the latter.

Another remarkable inconsistency into which he was led by his attempt to trace the thing-in-itself in this way is contained in the passage:—"Neither in inanimate, nor in animal nature, can any faculty of being determined otherwise than sensually be thought of." His solution of the

antinomy was that freedom is not incompatible with empirical necessity, if the empirical character is caused by an "intelligible" one having the power of originating actions the effects of which appear in the former. The intelligible character, the thing-in-itself of man, is the free will, which he erroneously calls reason. According to this there would be no thing-in-itself in inanimate things or in animals if the passage quoted above were true. His conclusion in regard to freedom is that it cannot be proved from experience either as a reality or as a possibility, that it is only a transcendental idea, but not incompatible with empirical necessity in nature. Schopenhauer, after proving the impossibility of tracing the thing-in-itself in the way followed by Kant, turns to introspection, finds there nothing but manifestations of the will, and concludes that our empirical character is objectivation, not the effect, or result, of the will. The feeling that we are, in reality, our own will, is the source of the firm conviction of our freedom and of our responsibility for all our actions, although the latter are invariably determined by motives in accordance with the law of cause and effect. The will, then, being our own "thing-in-itself," must be the same in all things, differing only in degree. This

is identical with the philosophy of the Buddhist, and accounts for the fact that "they love all things both great and small," recognising their common origin and destination. The question naturally suggests itself :—"How did we come to make our empirical character as it is?"

The answer to that lies beyond the domain of a philosophy which does not profess to go further than the limits of possible experience. The theory of reincarnation only carries the problem one step backward, and is, moreover, only made to suit the exigencies of the case. Whoever pretends to solve the riddle must assume his equality with God.

Seeing that the religion which has the greatest number of followers in the world succeeds in making these accept full responsibility for their actions in spite of the belief in empirical necessity, it is interesting to consider whether there is really any difference in Christian theory and practice, notwithstanding the constant affirmation of freedom.

The Roman Catholic Church which, from the use of the confessional, must have the most profound knowledge of human nature and character, knows that the human being, from the cradle to the grave, cannot be trusted to the unaided guidance

of his own will, and teaches that the sacraments are only the means to the attainment of "divine grace," without the co-operation of which man can do nothing of himself. Luther insisted on the necessity of the same spiritual influence (*Gnadenwirkung*). The doctrine of "Predestination," which seems revolting at first sight, implies simply that a man cannot alter his own character, and must rely on a higher power to do it for him. The necessity of being "born again" can have no other meaning. In all the idea is the same, viz., that alteration of character, or "salvation," is dependent on our complying with certain conditions. The Buddhist priest, in addition to practising rigid self-denial, has to spend hours every day contemplating on the love of his neighbour, in the hope that an influence from within may enable him to acquire the necessary altruism.

Although it may seem superfluous, after all that has been said, to argue as to the fact of empirical necessity, it is worth while to mention that one of the so-called philosophers¹ of Germany expresses the opinion that children are born without will or character, and that these are "manufactured" by education, which is as much

¹ Herbart, *Allgem. Pädagogik*.

in accordance with fact as if he said that they were born without a brain. The whole object of religious education is to supply the best and most powerful motives for acting on the will. Exercise may strengthen the influence of a motive while the will remains unchanged, as one may see any day when there is no longer any necessity for bringing a particular motive into play. It is then a case of "*autres temps autres mœurs*." If character were simply a matter of education, a certificate of education could be substituted for the indispensable certificate of character, and there would be no justice for the ignorant, nor would it be possible to apply to any man the expression "the wisest, brightest, meanest of mankind." Considering that Herbart displays such amazing ignorance in regard to a matter of common observation, it is not likely that his ideas about things beyond the bounds of experience can have any value, and it is a pity that students should be allowed to waste time in learning such nonsense for examination purposes.

Although Kant's "categorical imperative" is a distortion of the truth, his philosophy leads inevitably to the conclusion that human personality is rigidly subject to the law of cause and effect, that it is the manifestation of a transcen-

dental character which the individual is responsible for having created, and that it has a spiritual root which is the source of religion and conscience. Both Buddhism and Hinduism teach the same thing, that this life is a trial or "cross" to which one must submit in the hope that salvation may come from a supernatural power. It is not likely that the western mind, dominated as it is by primitive Judaism, and labouring under the grand delusion that this world is an object in itself, will admit that Christ's teaching was identical with that of Buddha. In the countries that flatter themselves as being the most progressive no quarter is given to any belief that might be opposed to egoism, more especially to that form of it which masquerades as patriotism ; for the highest Christian ideals are supposed to be incompatible with modern culture and progress. For this reason the great Schopenhauer is constantly cried down as an apostle of pessimism, because he says that suffering and disappointments are the lot of all, that these are necessary to bring about resignation and renouncement of all attachment to the world, but that one should, and can, notwithstanding these crosses, be happy by looking upon them as necessary for final emancipation. The fact is, he is denounced for preaching pure Christianity.

CHAPTER XVI

TRANSCENDENTAL AND OTHER FORMS OF
IDEALISM—HEGELISM.

By "transcendental" Kant meant not only the recognition of *à priori* cognitions, but also of the fact that, although not derived from experience, they can nevertheless, be applied to objects of experience. The objective world, as it appears to us, being dependent on certain *à priori* conditions, it is obvious that the latter can have no use beyond the bounds of possible experience.

This form of Idealism is to be distinguished from "empirical," according to which the existence of objects in Space outside us is either doubtful and unprovable, or false and impossible. The first is the "problematical" of Des Cartes, who maintained that the "I think" is the only certain fact of experience, because we cannot tell from sensations whether their cause is in us, or external to us. The second is the "dogmatic" of Berkeley, who asserted that Space and things in it are all "imagination."

Kant refutes both by proving that inner experience, which Des Cartes took for the only certainty, would be impossible without the existence of objects in Space. Inner experience of ourselves, being a determination of Time, would be impossible without supposing something persistent in the perception. But this persistent thing cannot be in us, for our existence in Time is first determined by it. Therefore the perception of the persistent is only possible through a thing external to us, and the consciousness of our own existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of outer things. If objects in Space were things in themselves, independent of our mode of cognition, then empirical idealism would be inevitable. Schopenhauer's statement of transcendental idealism is :—"No object without subject, and no subject without object." As everything objective has its existence in the consciousness of a subject, it is impossible even to think of an objective world without a subject to recognise it, and whose presentation it is. If the rest of the world were removed, and nothing but myself remained, my body would still only exist in my own cognition, that is to say, it would be dependent on my subject. The existence which is thus conditioned is that of something

extended and acting in Space. On the other hand, this may have an existence for itself that requires no subject and has neither extension nor action. This is the "thing-in-itself," which can never become an object for us, because it is neither in Space nor in Time. For the same reason Kant's "object-in-itself," which stands between the perception and the "thing-in-itself," is a contradiction.

The relation of subject to object is not that of cause and effect, for cause refers only to change of state. According to Fichte's so-called idealism, the subject creates the object from itself, for which manifestation of stupidity he was expelled from the University of Jena. The opposite mistake is that of supposing that the object creates the subject, and is known as materialism. Professor Haeckel is allowed, in the same University from which Fichte was expelled, to make an immortal fool of himself by pretending to found a materialistic philosophy on the supposition that Kant never existed, and that the well-established laws of Thermo-dynamics are only a delusion. Spinoza identifies subject and object by combining both under the name of "Substance."

Transcendental idealism was recognised by the

Vedanta School in a fundamental tenet which consisted, not in denying the existence of matter that is, of solidity, impenetrability and extended figure (to deny which would be lunacy), but in correcting the popular notion of it, and in contending that it has no essence independent of mental perception ; that existence and perceptibility are convertible terms.

Leibnitz, in order to explain the nature of his "objects-in-themselves" was obliged to assume that they were "subjects" (monads) endowed with the faculty of presentation, and so gave a striking proof that our consciousness in so far as it is a thing that recognises, can find nothing but subject and object.

Transcendental idealism is also empirical realism, but directly opposed to transcendental realism, which regards Time and Space and the objects in them as things-in-themselves independent of our sensibility.

Kant distinguishes reality from dream by saying that the presentations of the former are connected together by the law of causality. But the same is true in dreams, and the connection is only broken in the waking state. Nevertheless it is often difficult or impossible to tell from this criterion whether an event has been dreamt, or

has really happened, for we are not always in a position to trace the connection between a past event and the present moment. The only certain criterion is the total empirical one of actual life, by which the connection between dreams and the waking state is perceptibly severed. The relationship is, however, very close, and it is true that "we are such stuff as dreams are made of, and our little life is rounded with a sleep."

Since Hegel has been worshipped as a demi-god for nearly a century, while Kant has been completely ignored, it will be surprising to some to hear that, in so far as he was an "idealist," he was a Kantian. Kant, however, stopped short at the transcendental ideas, having proved that they could not give rise to a cognition, because their object was beyond the range of possible experience. Hegel, being himself a theologian, now came to the assistance of speculative Theology, and set himself the task of establishing the "objectivity" of the transcendental ideas. To prove the existence of a first cause was exceedingly simple. All that was necessary was to accept Spinoza's "Substance" theory, replace the word God by the "Absolute," the "Idea," "Abstract Being," etc., and then assume that,

although it might be impossible to prove the existence of a first cause in the case of a personal God, it was self-evident when the designation had been altered to suit the requirements of Spinozism. Again, Kant had said that the "practical reason" with its categorical affirmative presupposed freedom of the will, but that experience was, unfortunately, dead against it. Hegel was not long in discovering a suitable realisation of the idea in his theory of evolution.¹ According to this, Spinoza's "Substance" takes, so to speak, a somersault into a state of unconsciousness, and then commences a gradual recovery of consciousness in the various stages of nature, until the highest state was reached in the Protestant Germanic state. This state, therefore being the realization of the "Idea," the Church must take its religion from it. Under this arrangement the Roman Catholic Church is, of course, antireligious.

It might occur to some stupid person to inquire what arrangements the "Substance" had made, before passing into a state of unconsciousness, for carrying out the process of evolution in the right direction. Apparently it was provided that things should be left to blind chance until the beginning

¹ Philosophie der Geschichte.

of the 19th century, when a certain individual should publish a system of philosophy which would serve as a guide both to state and Church, and so insure that the evolution should continue its proper course. Needless to mention the name of the great philosopher. It is now manifest why Hegelism has been so popular in Germany; for it establishes the right of this favoured country to Germanise the rest of the world with the aid of the "mailed fist." Finally, since Kant proved that the logical function of reason could not bring about the necessary unity of the transcendental ideas, a way out of this difficulty had to be found. But no obstacle can stand in the way of a German "philosopher" when he has a definite object in view. Schelling discovered at once that the reason has a faculty of "intellectual perception," whereby we can perceive our own ego and the Deity with all their attributes. That there should be so many differences of opinion regarding things that could be directly perceived seemed to him to be no objection to his assumption. Fichte attributed the same function to the understanding. Hegel, having resolved to outdo Kant, could not allow such pigmies as Schelling and Fichte to settle the matter in their simple way, and so he effected a compromise by maintaining that the

“intellectual perception” of the former is not carried out directly, but by the intermediation of “reflection.” The object of his *Phänomologie* is to prove this. Anybody that understands what transcendental idealism has proved will see that Hegel might as well have attempted to “square the circle,” and that his work could be nothing else than what it really is, a farrago of unspeakable nonsense.

That the Hegelian so-called idealism should be a “source of consolation” to one of the most brilliant luminaries of the English Church may seem very curious, but I can vouch for the fact; for I heard him say so before a learned audience in London. The paradox that a minister of a Church which claims to be a source of inspiration for the individual and the state should be satisfied with the position assigned to the Church by Hegel is only equalled by the paradox that a Christian minister could not find “consolation” enough in the teaching of his Master. The truth is, that Hegel, sharing Dean Swift’s conviction that the human being is as little qualified for thinking as for flying, took Spinozism in one hand and Kantism in the other, and juggled with both with a success which entitles him to a place in history side by side with Simon Magus.

CHAPTER XVII

THE TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

ALTHOUGH the transcendental philosophy has been universally condemned, because it proves that reason can give us no knowledge of anything beyond the range of empirical experience, it is easy to show that Kant has, in reality, rendered a service to religion by compelling theologians to rely upon a more solid and reliable foundation than a capricious guide which must, from its very nature, ever remain a source of discord and intolerance. The history of the human race bears testimony to the fact that all the great religions of the world have had their origin in revelation, and that their founders appealed solely to man's spirit, not to his reasoning faculty. It would, indeed, be a monstrous injustice if it were otherwise ; for then the proud possessor of a superior intellect would have an advantage not only in the struggle for existence in this life, but for all eternity. We find, on the contrary, that the man of untutored mind has often a higher conception

of God and more true religion than his highly educated neighbours. Those that scoff in this enlightened age at the superstitions of the ignorant are a thousand times more superstitious in regard to their bodies than the latter are in regard to their souls, and betray an amazing credulity in accepting the delusive dogmas of medical science, because they hope to find in them a means of circumventing the laws of nature. It is idle to talk of religion when selfishness prompts a man to seek his own advantage in the sufferings of other living things.

Nobody could endeavour to make religion a matter of reason without involving himself in hopeless self-contradiction. Macaulay, who reiterated ad nauseam that the Roman Catholic Church was hopelessly wrecked on the "rock of reason," expressed, nevertheless, the opinion that it would be the religion of the world when the "New Zealander stands on London bridge surveying the ruins of St. Paul's." Schiller, the famous German poet and historian, said that the Reformation had no chance of success had not so many people of influence been attracted to it by the hope of sharing in the plunder of the vast possessions that were at that time in the hands of church dignitaries. Nor has the universal spread

of education and enlightenment since then given any advantage to the religions that claim for themselves a monopoly of reason. The self-styled "Rationalists," who turn up their eyes in admiration of the colossal wisdom of Haeckel when he explains the origin of life by saying that it is the result of "erotic chemico-tropism," and who fail to see that self-consciousness implies subject as well as object, show that it would be as hopeless to trust to their reason as to that of the Homunculus whom the famous Dr. Wagner distilled from his retort. Some of our leading men of science would be surprised to hear that they were guilty of rank superstition in denying the possibility of "*generatio equivoca*" and referring the origin of life to another planet. Nevertheless, the earth was at one time a glowing mass of fire, or what Bacteriologists would call a "pure culture," and the various forms of life appeared in accordance with the prevailing organic conditions; so that *generatio equivoca* must have been going on continuously. The truths of religion must have their origin in something that is not liable to err, and this is implied in the vital necessity of faith, which is incompatible with reason. That good works without faith do not justify is beyond question, because

they may be simply the prudent adaptation of means to an end, whereas they must appear, as a manifestation of faith, free from all selfish motives. The assumption of a "practical reason," with its "categorical affirmative," is a dangerous and baseless fiction which Kant never claimed to have proved as a fact. The anti-immorality League in Germany has to contend with a literature which maintains that, if we are bound to obey impulses that come to us from nature, our duty is to obey the strongest! Those that think that they can substitute ethical for religious teaching of the young will be taught by experience that they are suffering from a dangerous delusion. Practical reason is nothing but the application of the theoretical to the promotion of our interests in this life. Judged by such a test Christ himself would be universally condemned as the most unpractical. If the reason had a faculty of "perceiving" what is transcendental, as is claimed for it by the post-Kantian sham philosophers of Germany, there would be universal agreement in regard to religion, whereas England alone is supposed to contain over a hundred Christian sects, each of which claims to be the sole possessor of the truth.

The transcendental philosophy is the true

antidote to materialism, not the setting up of an immaterial soul in opposition to a material body, and it proves that a science of Metaphysics is impossible. The real enemies of religion are those that try to base the proofs of the existence of God and the immortality of the soul on metaphysical abstractions, the absurdity of which would be evident to the very few that could understand them, and which would be totally incomprehensible to the vast majority of the human race. The resort to such methods implies the abandonment of all belief in the necessity of faith and revelation.

THE END

